speeches

Speech at the Business Club e.V. and Club International, Leipzig
(Informal Translation of Text as Prepared for Delivery in German)

Ladies and Gentlemen,

In a world that is threatened by terrorism all States must have a strong interest keeping weapons of mass destruction out of the hands of rogue states or terrorists.

President Bush released the current version of the National Security Strategy of the United States in March of this year. As already seen in the fundamental statements of our security policy during the Clinton Administration, the American strategy is described as preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. That strategy aims above all to control the access to fissile materials necessary for the construction of nuclear weapons. This can be carried out in two ways:

• Firstly, that States are hindered from obtaining capacities with which they can manufacture material suitable for making nuclear weapons;
• Secondly, that the transfer of fissile materials to rogue states or terrorists is prevented.

In order to reach the first objective a loophole must be closed in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This loophole, which is currently being exploited by Iran, permits regimes to manufacture materials capable of fueling nuclear weapons under the cover of civilian programs.

In order to close this legal loophole the United States has introduced a proposal. According to this proposal, the leading nuclear powers would develop a safe, easy, and controllable system in which materials for peaceful uses of atomic energy can be passed on without a process in which materials capable of fueling nuclear weapons are spread.

Under this system all participating States will have unrestricted access to fissile materials necessary for civil nuclear reactors. In return, those states would be obliged not to build any facilities in which materials capable of fueling nuclear weapons could be manufactured.

For that reason, the U.S. is working on a multilateral system of reliable fuel supplies, together with other nuclear states and the International Atomic Energy Agency. The American Department of Energy has already made uranium available with which their obligations can be fulfilled.

In the long-term, we have proposed a Global Nuclear Energy Partnership. This initiative foresees a new international partnership in reactor and recycling technology in which the transmission of nuclear materials can be better controlled.

The second measure, designed to hinder the transfer of fissile materials to rogue States and terrorists, has to meet the risks posed by nuclear and radiological materials, which are not sufficiently protected. The Global Threat Reduction Initiative, which was called into life by the United States, the International Atomic Agency, and other countries, aims to reduce and localize the deposits of nuclear weapons-capable materials and other radiological materials.

We have been able to see the results of this initiative in the recent past. In cooperation between the USA, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and the International Atomic Agency, nuclear fuel was recently brought from a former Soviet research reactor to a secure deposit in Russia. These fuels would have been sufficient to construct two nuclear bombs.

However, there remains an abundance of hazardous enriched materials, which it is necessary to secure. The International Atomic Energy Agency counts 274 research reactors in 57 countries, half of which use highly enriched Uranium. With the Global Threat Reduction Initiative we want to convert these reactors so that they can operate with low enriched uranium. Other countries share this target with us. For example, we support Norway’s efforts to minimize the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian applications.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

Let me briefly go into the challenges that we are facing in Iran.

The United States is working closely with Europe and other countries in order to strengthen the authority of the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Iranian government is increasingly jeopardizing these efforts and the credibility of the UN agency in Vienna, in that they are disregarding international obligations and the concerns of the international community.

Since 2003, the International Atomic Energy Agency has been intensely occupied in finding out how Iran has been building up its nuclear capacity.

Last September, after two years of investigation, the IAEA came to two important concluding requirements:

• First, Iran has violated its obligations which it subjected its country to under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;

• Second, the international community does not believe Iran anymore, that it wants to use its nuclear program for peaceful means.

After Iran was given numerous opportunities to distance itself from the fears of the international community, the International Atomic Energy Agency finally forwarded their concluding requirements to the UN Security Council in February of this year.

In March, the UN Security Council issued a Presidential Statement that called on Iran to undertake a set of confidence- building measures recommended by the IAEA. Furthermore, the Director General of the IAEA, Dr. El-Baradei, was asked by the Security Council to make a report by the end of Aril on how Iran reacted to the declaration.

Great Britain and France introduced a new resolution in the United Nations Security after Iran allowed this respite to lapse calling for a new resolution for the Iranian nuclear program, which is supported by the United States and Germany. This could be followed by sanctions if Iran does not stop its uranium enrichment.

The Security Council no longer has any other option than to act accordance with Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. It is now time, especially for those states maintaining close relations with Iran, to take responsibility. The United States believes sanctions to be the right path. Sanctions will isolate the Iranian government and increase diplomatic pressure. Eventually, they will convince the government in Teheran to return to a reasonable policy that will consist of a stop to uranium enrichment and a return to the negotiation table. The Iranian people will realize, through contacts to the outside world via Internet and other means, that their government is pushing their country into isolation, and they will not allow this.


Former Soviet Union

The efforts of Europe and the United States to reach a diplomatic solution with Iran are timely. The threat of weapons of mass destruction is, however, not new. The problem especially prevalent after the fall of the Soviet Union.

This growing threat to the national security of the United States energized the American Congress in the 1990’s to extend the Initiative on Containment of Weapons of Mass Destruction to the countries of the former Soviet Union.

These efforts by the United States can be outlined under the term “Cooperative Threat Reduction”. Three departments in our government were instructed with the implementation. The Department of Energy has inherited the task of taking nuclear weapons capable materials to safe deposits and in some cases to convert them back into low level enriched uranium. The Department of Defense is responsible for the dismantling of unsafe nuclear weapons and their carrier systems, as well as production and research sites and biological and chemical weapons. The Department of State takes care of the scientists who have developed weapons of mass destruction. It helps them to find work in civil projects and with this, gives them an alternative to selling their knowledge to states who are interested in building weapons of mass destruction.

You are all aware reports of scientist from the former Soviet Union, especially from central Asia and the Caucuses, who are enlisted by states to place their knowledge of the construction of weapons at their disposal. In 2003, a poll among Russian scientists who work in the fields of nuclear, biological and chemical technology was conducted. According to that poll, 20% of those interviewed could imagine working in North Korea, Syria, Iran or Iraq for one year or more. There were similar results in other parts of the world where there are scientists and technicians with special knowledge about nuclear technology.

The U.S. Department of State was thus called upon to develop programs in order to prevent the migration of scientists.

With the program “Nonproliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Expertise” (NWMDE), the U.S. government supports scientists who have worked in weapons programs and aids them searching for new fields of work.

There are three subprograms whose focus is in the former Soviet Union:

• Science Centers

• Bio/Chem Redirect, and

• The Bio-Industry Initiative

While the programs have different main focuses and work with different methods, they are connected by one common goal: to support institutes and their employees who have worked on highly dangerous weapon programs, and to enable their transition towards independence on the global information market.

Science Centers

With the fall of the Soviet Union in the early 90’s there were widespread fears in the governments of different States about the fate of the unemployed scientists and engineers who once worked on the development of weapons of mass destruction and their carrying systems.

There were questions whether, under the hard economic times after the fall of the Soviet Union, these scientists would be willing to sell their knowledge and abilities to rogue States.

In 1992 there was an international agreement to establish two multilateral Science Centers in order to meet this threat head on and to give scientists an alternative. Even today these Centers are the most important institutions in the endeavor to confine the construction of weapons of mass destruction. Through them, scientists from the former Soviet Union who formerly worked on weapons programs receive the opportunity to conduct peaceful research.

The “International Science and Technology Center” (ISTC) in Moscow and the “Science and Technology Center in Ukraine” (STCU) in Kiev are interstate Organizations which are controlled by the member states and supported by the staff in the former Soviet member states.

The United States, Canada, and the European Union are for the most part responsible for the financial needs of the centers, and each have positions on the administrative councils of these independent institutions alongside the host country representatives. The US is represented through the Department of State.

Japan also participates on the administrative council in the Center in Moscow and has observer status in the Center in Kiev. South Korea and Norway participate and are members at the cost of the Moscow Science Center. In 1994, the ISTC gave out its first advanced payments to Russian scientists, while the STCU in Kiev was established the following year.

Former scientists from the ISTC States Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Kurdish Republic, Russia and Tajikistan and the STCU States Azerbaijan, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine and Uzbekistan compete with one another through their presentation of Research proposals in the Centers of Moscow or Kiev. In the meantime, 650 Million dollars have been given out for more than 2200 projects with over 55,000 Scientists and Engineers participating from the former Soviet Republics.

Aside from the financing of projects, the Science Centers feature management and marketing training as well as labor and manufacturing interns and help with patent approvals, the search for commercial partners in donator countries and with the development of prototypes.

Bio-Chem Redirect

The “Bio-Chem Redirection Program” (BCR) was established for scientists from the former Soviet Union who worked on the development of chemical and biological weapons. The intent is for them to be integrated through the program into transparent and sustainable civil projects. In cooperation with American research agencies they conduct projects which are supported by the scientific programs of the US Health and Social Agency, the Agricultural Agency, and the Environmental Protection Agency in the areas such as combating terrorist attacks on health, agriculture and natural resources. Apart from that, money is made ready to give stipends to the researchers, financing for laboratory equipment, and travel expenses for conferences and exchange programs. Although the emphasis of the “Bio-Chem Redirection Program” lies in Russia, there are also projects supported in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Uzbekistan and Ukraine.

Bio-Industry Initiative

Through the “Bio-Industry Initiative” (BII) the threat of an attack of Biological terrorism should be countered through the targeted conversion of former research and production sites for biological weapons.

The “Bio-Industry Initiative” follows two goals:
· The conversion of former Soviet biological weapons research and production sites into institutions for peaceful means.
· The discovery and creation of medications and vaccinations for highly contagious diseases in cooperation with American pharmaceutical firms.

Through this cooperation of mainly Russian and American scientists in the academic as well as the industrial sector, the institutions and individual scientists will acquire the skills for the commercialization and the legal coordination and economic utilization of their discoveries and technologies. The “Bio-Industry Initiative” works close together with large American companies, such as DOW, Eli Lilly and Dupont. These firms obtain, in turn, valuable experiences through this cooperation that benefits them in their economic engagement in the former Soviet Union.

Iraq

The US Department of State also conducts a program in Iraq whose task is to stop the dispersion of knowledge of weapons of mass destruction. The program is conceived for about 500 Iraqi scientists and technicians and targets larger projects in the areas of environment, water, agriculture and health.

Additionally, the “Iraq Interim Center for Science and Industry” (IICSI) was founded in 2004, which is supposed to achieve the status of an international organization.

The Center has 12 Iraqi employees and follows four goals:
· It collects and appraises applications from research and industrial projects which employed former experts of weapons of mass destruction. Currently over 100 projects have been set up.
· It pays out stipends to around 150 Iraqi scientists and technicians to stabilize their scientific situation. This is intended to prevent the selling of their knowledge to foreigners.
· It coordinates the participation of Iraqi Scientists in different workshops, conferences and training possibilities that take place in Jordan and other countries.
· It plans setup a branch office in Basra, together with Great Britain.

If the security situation permits the Department of State plans the following additional steps:

· Take up talks with the new Iraqi administration with the goal of establishing the IICSI as an international organization, similar to the science centers in the former Soviet Union. After which, the two Americans, who currently support the Center through US diplomacy, would be employed as workers within the Center.
· Initiate the development of projects which serve the national reconstruction.
· Reinforce efforts to bring Iraqi scientists into contact with firms interested in investing in Iraq. The first good opportunity for this will be the exhibition “Rebuild Iraq 2006” which will take place in Amman.

The example of Libya

After Libya declared in 2003 that it would cease its project of building weapons of mass destruction, it asked the international community for help in its efforts to give their weapons experts new job perspectives.

The American Department of State developed a program in which this personnel group would be included. These operations were successful in areas which have special meaning for Libya, for example water management, desalinization of oceanic water, nuclear medicine, oil and gas technologies, and environmental monitoring.

Likewise, there were partnerships arranged between technicians from Libya and Great Britain as well as with the U.S. Energy Agency, the “U.S. Industrial Coalition” (An association of American firms, which converts technologies used in former weapons laboratories into peaceful products, with the help of NGO’s and Universities). The program for Libya was also conceived as a possible phase-out model for other States that, for example North Korea, continue the spread of nuclear technology.

South and Southeast Asia

My former colleagues in the respective office at the Department of State tell me they will launch a threat reduction program this year in South and South East Asia that will be a bit different than the rest. The focus will be on the securing dangerous pathogen collections and improving general biosecurity measures, in order to better address the potential biological risks associated with the emergence of both a rapidly expanding bioscience sector and radical Islamic groups in the region. Our approach will balance national security interests with appropriate development of public health infrastructure to rapidly identify and respond to highly infectious disease, like avian influenza.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

this evening I have tried to give you an insight into the complicated issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. To keep these weapons under control is a great challenge for the American government, their allies, and friends.

Iran’s striving for nuclear weapons, with which I started my speech, presents a large problem. It dominates not only last week’s headlines, but also the agenda for governments on both sides of the Atlantic.

I have provided you with an overview of what the American Department of State is doing so that researchers who worked on weapons of mass destruction have a new occupational field in the civil sector. I hope that this awakens your interest in this theme, beyond the headlines, and also gives you an example of effective International cooperation.

I had two very interesting years when I had to manage the U.S. involvement in the ISTC and I thank you for giving me the opportunity today, to share my experiences with you.